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Louisiana's New Public Defender System: Origins,
Main Features, and Prospects for Success

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Louisiana legislature enacted a landmark reform of
the state indigent defense system.' It established a Louisiana Public
Defender Board to enforce statewide performance standards and
administer the state indigent defense fund. The legislature has also
significantly increased state spending on indigent defense since
2005. These changes were driven by a broad coalition of groups
pressing for improved indigent defense, as well as Louisiana
Supreme Court decisions mandating better support as a matter of
state constitutional law.
Considered in isolation, this may seem like a straightforward
victory for equal justice and the rights of criminal defendants.
However, the lasting success of these reforms is uncertain.
Louisiana has tried several times over the past forty years to put its
indigent defense system on a sound footing. At best, each round of
reform provided only temporary relief. Effective change was
prevented by the legislature's reluctance to fund the system
adequately and by a persistent suspicion of centralized state control
over local indigent defense.
The campaign to create the new Public Defender Board was
carefully crafted to surmount these obstacles, but there is no
guarantee they will not return with undiminished force to hinder
the new system's implementation. In particular, adequate funding
for indigent defense is an inherently fragile achievement,
vulnerable to sudden shifts in the political environment. If the new
public defender system is eventually starved of money, the
Louisiana Supreme Court may have to grapple again with moving
the political branches to comply with the constitutional right to
counsel. Yet the experience of Louisiana and other states teaches
that judicial action alone cannot make up for deterioration in the
political coalition supporting reform.
Apart from the funding issue, the Public Defender Board faces
an immense organizational task in asserting its control over
Louisiana's heretofore radically decentralized system for providing
indigent defense. The new statutory scheme is actually an intricate
compromise between advocates of state control and defenders of
local autonomy. It abolished the local boards that were the
Copyright 2009, by RICHARD DREw.

1. Louisiana Public Defender Act, 2007 La. Acts No. 307, § 1 (codified as
amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:141-184 (2005 & Supp. 2009)).
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foundation of the old indigent defense framework, but it did not
establish a consolidated statewide system. Instead, local indigent
defense bodies are left in a fundamentally ambiguous status. Local
chief defenders have independent local funding and control of
everyday operations, but they must now answer to the state board
in terms of performance standards and in getting approval for their
annual budget. In places where significant vested interests have
grown up around the local provision of indigent defense, this may
well prove a formula for conflict and resistance to central
authority.
The new board may find itself hampered in these disputes by
certain features of the statutory scheme. There is a substantial risk
of delay as a result of the massive rulemaking task the new board
is given. Confusion may also follow from serious statutory
ambiguities on the balance of power between the local chief
defenders and the new regional offices the board is authorized to
create. Finally, the state board's ability to control local defense
systems is hindered by the statute's relatively narrow grounds for
the dismissal of local chief defenders.
Part II of this article examines the background and origins of
the new reform. Part III describes the main features of the bill and
the conflicting interests that shaped them. Part IV sets out potential
obstacles to its effective implementation and recommends some
changes to the statutory scheme that could help alleviate them.
II. BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF THE NEW SYSTEM

A. The FirstRound of Reform: Gideon's Aftermath in Louisiana
In the wake of Gideon v. Wainwright making publicly provided2
counsel for state indigent defendants a federal constitutional right,
Louisiana in 1966 instituted a system of local indigent defender3
boards to better administer the right to counsel in the state courts.
Prior to Gideon, Louisiana already had a statutory right to counsel
for indigent defendants charged with a felony. 4 Trial judges
assigned counsel from an informally kept roster of local lawyers,
who generally received no compensation for their work.5 However,

2.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

3. 1966 La. Acts No. 366.
4. See State v. Blankenship, 172 So. 4, 5 (La. 1937).
5. Gerald A. Rault, Comment, Representation of Indigents in Criminal
Cases: Guidelinesfor Louisiana,27 LA. L. REv. 592, 600-01 (1967).
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was
under Louisiana's pre-Gideon system no legal representation
6
provided when an indigent defendant chose to plead guilty.
The initial post-Gideon system required the district judges in
each judicial district to appoint a district indigent defender board.7
These boards took over maintenance of the local rosters of
appointee lawyers and were given the power to manage their
assignments. 8 They were also charged with administering the first
dedicated source of public funding for indigent defense. By state
law, a new fee was added to the fines and costs assessed for each
criminal conviction in a district court. 9 The money collected was
then transferred directly to the local indigent defense fund. 10 These
funds were intended to allow appointed counsels to get some
reimbursement for their
expenses, making indigent defense less of
1
a burden for the bar. '
These local boards funded by local court fines formed the
enduring institutional foundation of indigent defense in the state,
surviving basically unaltered until 2007. Despite this longevity, a
number of basic inadequacies were apparent from the very
beginning. The initial court fines were both too low and too
narrowly applied to secure even the limited goal of reimbursing
assigned counsel for their expenses. 12 Besides the revenue issue,
the lack of any state body overseeing the local boards meant there
was no way to ensure that basic standards for providing indigent
defense were followed consistently across the state. Funding
shortfalls and the lack of central authority were the main impetus
for all subsequent efforts at reform.
B. The Second Round of Reform: A New Constitution, Expanded
Local Funding,and a Stillborn State Board
In 1974, Louisiana enacted a new constitution that bolstered
the right to counsel in the state by enjoining the legislature to
"provide for a uniform system for securing and compensating
qualified counsel for indigents."' 3 In 1976, the legislature
attempted to follow through on this mandate with the Uniform
Indigent Defender Act.' 4 The Act expanded local court fine
6. State v. Hilaire, 45 So. 2d 360, 362 (La. 1950).
7. 1966 La. Acts No. 366.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Rault, supra note 5, at 600-01.
Id.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
1976 La. Acts No. 653.
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funding by increasing the amount of money that could be collected
from each defendant and expanding the range of offenses to which
the fine applied. 15 Instead of being limited to criminal convictions
in district court, a fee was assessed in all courts of original
jurisdiction to all convictions above the level of parking
violations. 16 In effect, this meant indigent defense would be largely
funded by a charge added onto traffic tickets, since 7they have long
made up the bulk of criminal violations by number.'
Given the increased income, local systems were able to support
delivery methods beyond assigning local attorneys and
compensating their expenses. Thus, in the same law, indigent
defense boards were given the power to establish public defender
agencies staffed by salaried attorneys and managed by a local chief
indigent defender. Some years later, the legislature also authorized
a third permissible method of delivery: contracts with lawyers in
private practice to take on the district's public defense work. 8
In the years since local districts were given the power to
choose their mode of operation, almost all have used some mix of
these three different methods. There are two broad tendencies.
Currently, seven of forty-one judicial districts rely predominantly
on public defender agencies with salaried employees.19 The rest of
the judicial districts provide the bulk of their services through
contract attorneys. 20 Regardless of how it organizes its services,
each district retains the power to assign cases to private attorneys
whenever the local system has reached the limit of its capacity or
when there is a conflict of interests between defendants making it
inappropriate for a local public defender office to represent both.1
Besides expanding local funding and allowing local boards
some choice in their mode of delivery, the legislature in 1976 also
tried to add some degree of state oversight to the mix. 22 The
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS
TO JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT SERVICES IN LOUISIANA

40 YEARS AFTER GIDEON 23 (2004) [hereinafter PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE].
18. 1986 La. Acts No. 94.
19. La. Justice Coalition, Louisiana's System: Public Defense in Louisiana
Today, http://www.lajusticecoalition.org/public+defense/louisiana+ system (last
visited Mar. 29, 2009).
20. Id.
21. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:165(B)(1) (Supp. 2009). The new reform
shifts the power of assignment from the presiding district judge to the local chief
defender. Id.
22. For an overview of the act and brief discussion of its goals in creating a
new board, see Robert Pugh, The Uniform Indigent Defender Act, 24 LA. B.J. 137
(1976).
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Uniform Indigent Defender Act created for the first time a state
board to help manage indigent defense.23 However, the board's
powers were vaguely defined as the authority to "coordinate" and
"facilitate" the activities of the local systems. 24 Moreover, though
it was given the power to award up to $10,000 in supplementary
funds to each indigent defense district, 25 the legislature never
appropriated the necessary money.26 As a result, the 1976 board
was almost entirely dormant during its short lifespan. 2 7 Despite the
strong belief among the board's supporters that some central
authority was required to make the system effective, the legislature
was clearly unenthusiastic from the very beginning. In 1981, the
board was formally abolished leaving behind little or no sign it had
ever operated.28
Following the second round of reform, Louisiana indigent
defense was better funded and had more flexibility, but the same
basic inadequacies remained. There was still no oversight at the
state level for how local boards ran their systems. As a result, there
was no way to guarantee even minimal consistency in the quality
of indigent defense throughout the state, despite the 1974
constitution's mandate that the legislature ensure uniformity. In
addition, relying mostly upon local traffic fines was a
fundamentally unstable arrangement even though the 1976
statutory reform had increased the income obtainable from them.
Revenues in a district could rise and fall dramatically depending on
local law enforcement's shifting enforcement of highway safety
laws. 29 Even without any change in enforcement policy, there was
no guarantee in any district that the level of traffic fines would
track the caseload of felony defendants that make up the bulk of
indigent defense work. 30 Further, since the local fine money stayed
in that area, there was no way to redistribute 3funds from districts
with a surplus to those facing severe shortfalls. '
Moving into the 1980s, these pre-existing problems combined
with sharply higher crime and incarceration rates to push an
already inadequate system into a state of chronic crisis. In
Louisiana and across the nation, violent crime and property crime
23. 1976 La. Acts No. 653.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Interview with James Boren, Board Member, La. Ass'n of Criminal
Def. Lawyers (LACDL), in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 15, 2007).
27. Id.
28. 1981 La. Acts No. 873.
29. PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 24-25.
30. Id. at 23-24.
31. Id.
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rates increased beginning in the mid 1960s, reaching their peak in
the early 1990s." In reaction, governments in the 1970s and
especially the 1980s shifted to substantially more punitive crime
control policies across the board, with a special emphasis on the
drug offenses perceived to be at the root of the overall crime
33 Between 1970 and 1990, adult drug arrests more than
problem.
• 34
tripled. This led to a massive expansion of incarceration.
Between 1980 and 1995, the population of state and federal prisons
tripled. 35 Louisiana more than kept pace with these trends; it
currently has the 36
highest incarceration rate in the nation by a
substantial margin.
The combination of more crime and a much harsher response
to it produced exploding indigent defense caseloads. Between 1986
and 1992 alone, Louisiana indigent cases rose from 69,000 to
114,000-an increase of more than 60%. 37 The funding from local
traffic fines did not come close to keeping pace with the increase,
so there was usually no way to employ enough attorneys to handle
the additional cases. 38 As a result, the indigent defense system
39 was
near collapse in several parts of the state by the early 1990s.

32. U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME STATE-

BY-STATE AND NATIONAL

TRENDS,

1960-2007 (2008), http://bjsdata.ojp.

usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/StatebyState.cfm (select "Louisiana"
and "United "States-Total" from menu (a) and "Number of violent crimes" and
"Number of property crimes" from menu (b) to get the four relevant tables).
33. See Alfred Blumstein, Prisons: A Policy Challenge, in CRIME: PUBLIC
POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2002).
34. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ESTIMATED
ARRESTS

FOR DRUG

ABUSE

VIOLATIONS

BY AGE,

1970-2006

(2007),

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ (select "Key Facts at a Glance" link; then "Drug
Arrests" under "Crime trends;" then the "Drug Arrests" chart; and then the next
"Drug Arrests" chart to get the relevant table).
35. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ADULT
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, 1980-2007 (2008), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
(select the Key Facts at a Glance link; then "Corrections Trends;" then
"Correctional populations;" and then the "Adult Correctional Populations,
1980-2007" chart to get the relevant table).
36. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2007 18 (2008), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/p07.pdf. At the end of 2007, Louisiana had 865 prison inmates for
every 100,000 residents. Mississippi, the second place state, had 734 prison
inmates per 100,000 residents. Id.
37. Pascal Calogero, The Right To Counsel and Indigent Defense, 41 LOY.
L. REv. 265, 273 (1995).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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C. The Third Round of Reform: The Louisiana Supreme Court
Tries to Force Change
Faced with an indigent defense system in crisis and no
movement in the political branches to address it, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Pascal
Calogero, set in motion a new round of indigent defense reform. In
doing so, the court had to rely solely on its own authority, without
the prospect of support from the United States Supreme Court. In
Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court had held that a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution must demonstrate substandard
representation by the claimant's attorney and show a reasonable
probability that this failure made a difference in the outcome of the
trial. 40 Not only was this standard extremely hard to reach, it
virtually ruled out consideration of the sort of systemic
deficiencies that were crippling Louisiana indigent defense.41
Instead, the inquiry for right to counsel cases under the U.S.
Constitution was limited to the conduct of a particular lawyer in a
particular case. 42 Therefore, the judicial effort to address the
Louisiana crisis would need to be entirely homegrown, relying on
Louisiana law and the Louisiana Constitution.
1. Peart, the Start of State Funding, and a PermanentState
Board
The Louisiana Supreme Court first authorized the counsel of
the Louisiana Judicial Conference to contract with a national
organization, the Spangenberg Group, to conduct a study of
Louisiana indigent defense.43 In 1992, the study found systemic
and grave deficiencies. It recommended an immediate doubling of
indigent funding, a switch to state instead of local funding, and the
creation of a state public defender commission to establish and

40. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
41. Charles M. Kreamer, Comment, Adjudicating the Peart Motion: A
Proposed Standard to Protect the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
Prospectively, 39 LOY. L. REV. 635, 635-36 (1994).
42. On the impact of Stricklandon effective representation claims, see Mary
Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right To Counsel in Criminal Cases: A
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGs L.J. 1031, 1087-89 (2006).
43. Walt Sanchez, George Steimel & Jim Boren, And It Only Took 44
Years: HB 436, the LouisianaPublic Defender Board, and the New Structure of
Indigent Defense, THE ADVOCATE (LACDL, Baton Rouge, La.), June 2007, at
19-20, http://lacdl.org/Newsletters.cfn.
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enforce standards. 44 The study brought forth no immediate
response from the legislature. In 1993, the supreme court handed
down State v. Peart, in which it found that the Orleans Parish
indigent defense system was so overloaded and underfunded as to
create a rebuttable presumption that the defendants had received
ineffective representation of counsel
in violation of article I,
45
section 13 of the state constitution.
The case was brought by a young New Orleans public defender
named Rick Teissier, who found himself burdened with a workload
of over 400 cases in the first seven months of 1991 alone. 46 He
received essentially no staff or investigative support.47 In response,
he brought suit in the name of all his current clients, claiming that
the conditions of the Orleans indigent defense system denied them
effective representation and asking that the Louisiana system of
local financing be struck down as a violation the state
constitution's mandate that the provision of counsel be "uniform"
throughout the state.48 The district court judge Franted this request,
holding the funding system unconstitutional.4 He also
mandated
50
specific caseload limits for Orleans public defenders.
The supreme court refused to go so far when the case came
before it. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Calogero held that
the funding system was constitutional, in part because it found that
litigants could not claim any individual right from article 1, section
13's requirement that the provision of counsel be uniform across
the state. 5 ' The mandate was held to be directed at the legislature
alone. The court also overturned the establishment of caseload
limits for the New Orleans system. Refusing to depart so sharply
from Strickland's approach, the court held that every determination
of ineffective representation must be on an individual basis52
defendant by defendant, not for an entire system at once.
Nevertheless, and with a good deal of ambiguity, the court found
that trial courts could hear ineffective representation claims based
on systemic factors before a trial. 53 Moreover, trial courts could
consolidate multiple claims in the early stages and make some
"global findings" about the conditions of representation, findings
44. Calogero, supra note 37, at 274-75.
45. 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993).
46. Id. at 784.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 784-85.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 786-87.
Id at 788.

53.

Id.
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that presumably were to have significant weight in the
individualized determinations of ineffective assistance of
counsel.54
Yet if the court in Peartleft some doubt about how trial judges
should handle ineffective representation claims based on systemic
factors, it was absolutely clear about the result it expected from its
decision: political action to reform Louisiana indigent defense. It
cited the Spangenberg Group study approvingly and explicitly
invited the legislature to take action threatening to impose its own
solution otherwise. 55 Just as important, the remedy it set out for
successful Peartclaims was severe enough to grab the attention of
the other branches of government. In the event that a presumption
of ineffective representation was established and not rebutted by
the state, trial courts were authorized to halt prosecutions until
adequate resources for the defense effort were found. 56 If enough
defendants were successful in making claims under Peart, the
criminal justice process would grind to a halt.
In response, deliberations began in the legislature about
reforming the system. At this point, a fateful divide appeared in
Louisiana's criminal defense community. The Louisiana
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (LACDL), an
organization intended to represent all defense lawyers in the state,
both in private practice and public employment, pushed for the
creation of a consolidated, state-funded system in which a central
state office would directly manage all the local systems. 57 In doing
so, the LACDL put itself in line with a longstanding body of
opinion in national legal organizations favoring statewide public
defender agencies as the surest mechanism for establishing
professional, uniform defense representation. 58 Yet just when this
54. Id.
55. Id. at 790-91.
56. Id. at 791-92.
57. Boren Interview, supra note 26; Telephone Interview with Paul Marx,
Former Executive Director, La. Pub. Defenders Ass'n (LAPDA), in Baton
Rouge, La. (Oct. 30, 2007).
58. See, e.g., MODEL PUBLIC DEFENDER ACT (1970) (recommending
creation of statewide defender organization). Nationally, nineteen states
currently have pure statewide defender organizations, with full state power and
entirely state funding. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATEWIDE INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEMS 3 (2005), http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/
sclaid/indigentdefense/statewideinddefsystems2005.pdf. Five additional states
have state bodies with generally full power but are limited either in their
geographic reach or in the types of cases they handle. Id. The other twenty-six
states either mix state and local power in their funding and control, or they are
purely local. Id. As discussed infra notes 145-171, Louisiana remains a mixed
state and local system even after its latest reform.
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proposal seemed to be gathering support, fierce opposition sprang
up from an unexpected source: the Louisiana Public Defenders
Association (LAPDA).59
Representing the chief indigent defenders and the other
indigent defense attorneys from each district, the LAPDA had only
come into being a few years before as a way to provide more
specialized and appropriate continuing legal education for its
members. 60 The prospect of a new statewide system triggered its
emergence as a political force. The chief local defenders objected
to a new centralized system on several grounds. First, it
threatened to destroy the significant number of successful local
systems that had developed despite adverse conditions. Second,
whatever its problems, the system of local funding based on local
court fines was at least independent of the annual state budget
process and its uncertainties. Finally, giving a state body complete
power over the personnel in local systems threatened to make them
irresistible targets for political patronage appointments that could
destroy their effectiveness.
The conflict between LACDL's centralizing vision and
LAPDA's localist resistance effectively doomed any legislative
action in 1993. The LAPDA turned to its ready-made network of
defenders in each judicial district to turn enough legislators away
from the consolidated state organization as a viable reform. 62 Thus,
in the fall of 1993, Chief Justice Calogero recommended to the
state judicial conference that the "[Louisiana Supreme] Court find
some way to motivate the leislative and executive branches to
consider this issue in earnest." Deciding to jumpstart the political
process rather than attempt a purely judicial solution, he convened
a meeting of executive and legislative branch leaders at the
supreme court in January of 1994 .64 This was followed with a
statewide consultation process and ultimately by Governor Edwin
Edwards appointing a Task Force on Indigent Defense chaired by
Calogero and the President of the State Senate.65
In May of 1994, the Task Force recommended that the supreme
court use its own rulemaking authority to create a statewide board
that would establish statewide standards for indigent defense and
administer state funding to supplement local indigent defense
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Marx Telephone Interview, supra note 57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Calogero, supra note 37, at 275.
Id.
Id.
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budgets.66 It asked the legislature to a19ropriate $10 million as an
initial state aid for indigent defense. The supreme court duly
created the Louisiana Indigent Defense Board in July of 1994.
The legislature appropriated $5 million, half of what had been
69
recommended but still the first real state aid for indigent defense.
This increased to $7.5 million the next year.70 The new state board
used its budget to set up dedicated funds for capital defense,
appellate work, and expert testimony, with the remainin 1 funds
available as general subsidy for districts in particular need.1 State
funds supplemented but did not replace the existing system of local
funding through fine money.
At the same time it was involved in the political process of
creating a new board and securing state funding, the Louisiana
Supreme Court was also acting in its judicial capacity to expand
the reach of the principles it had announced in Peart. In State v.
Wigley,72 the court dealt with the issue of compensation for
assigned counsel. As a way to relieve pressure from overburdened
indigent defense systems, local courts had relied on their power to
assign cases to members of the local bar, who often served with
little or no compensation since local indigent funding was
exhausted.73 In Wigley, several lawyers assigned as defense
counsel in capital cases challenged the lack of compensation as a
violation of their substantive due process rights under the
Louisiana Constitution. The court held that representing indigent
defendants without payment was a periodic professional obligation
that could be required of all lawyers.74 However, it limited this rule
significantly by holding that the attorneys had a right to receive
repayment of expenses incurred in their service.7 5 In another postPeartcase, State v. Touchet, the court held that indigent defendants
had a right to receive funds for expert testimony upon establishing
a reasonable probability that the testimony would assist their
defense and that the failure to obtain it would result in an unfair
trial.76
66. Id. at 276.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 59.
71. Calogero, supra note 37, at 277.
72. 624 So. 2d 425 (La. 1994).
73. Id. at 427. Assignment was also sometimes ethically necessary when
there was a conflict of interest between defendants making it inappropriate for
them to be represented by the same defender office.
74. Id. at 426, 428-29.
75. Id. at 429.
76. 642 So. 2d 1213, 1221-22 (La. 1994).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

In 1997, the legislature reauthorized the board and placed it
within the executive branch, changing its initial status as part of the
judicial branch created by supreme court rule. 77 It was renamed the
Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board (LIDAB). The
change resulted in part from the district attorneys' perception that
the defense board's location within the judicial branch impaired78
the courts' impartiality between the prosecution and defendants.
The supreme court itself was also uncomfortable having formal
authority over such a large administrative task.7 9 This move did not
result in any change in the board's powers or funding.
2. The Fate of the Peart-EraReforms
The round of reform that began to take effect in 1994
ameliorated some of the worst effects of the early 1990s crisis in
Louisiana indigent defense. The state funding provided urgently
needed help for capital cases, appellate work, and districts facing
the most severe burdens. However, it was a failure as a long-term
solution. There were two large, interrelated problems with the
post-Peart system. The state funding was stagnant, and the state
board was unable to secure or even demand real compliance with
statewide standards in indigent defense provision.
Funding was only increased the second year of state
appropriations, from $5 million to $7.5 million.80 After that it was
stagnant at approximately the $7.5 million level for almost a
decade. 8' A flat level of appropriation did not even keep up with
inflation, much less the ongoing strain of the caseloads produced
by Louisiana's exceptionally punitive criminal justice system.
The funding issue aggravated the weakness of the LIDAB. The
board had no regulatory authority over local indigent defense
systems. It had the power to create state standards for issues like
the proper training for public defenders, but its only effective
enforcement lever to secure compliance was to withhold state
funds.82 The LIDAB never felt it was in a position to use this stick.
The funding crisis having been only temporarily abated,
withholding any money at
83 all from local systems slipping back into
crisis seemed too severe.
77. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:146 (2005 & Supp. 2009).
78. Boren Interview, supra note 26.
79. Interview with Professor Cheney Joseph, Executive Counsel to the
Governor, 1996-2000, in Baton Rouge, La. (Sept. 14, 2007).
80. PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 59.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 60.
83. Id.
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Therefore, the same problem that had sparked Peart-era
reform-caseloads far in excess of the resources to deal with
them-returned in full force just a few years later. Meanwhile, the
State had made little progress towards establishing any effective
statewide standards in the provision of indigent defense. What was
the court's reaction? The Louisiana Supreme Court had after all
handed down Peart,a decision seemingly ready-made to deal with
a renewed crisis. Lower courts had been authorized to halt
prosecutions upon defendants establishing a presumption that
systemic problems like excessive caseloads had denied them
effective assistance of counsel. There was nothing in principle that
prevented the Louisiana judiciary from bringing criminal
prosecutions to a standstill until the legislature created a more
effective solution.
But to expect this was to have misread Peartitself, which was
intentionally crafted to be more of an exceptional prod to the
political branches than a routine tool of judicial intervention. After
all, Peartdrew a strong dissent from Justice Dennis precisely on
the grounds that it provided a poor foundation for future judicial
development of the right to counsel.84 On the one hand, it was too
cautious. The trial court in the early stages of the litigation had not
only declared Orleans Parish's indigent defense system
unconstitutional, it had provided clear and precise standards for
how it was to be repaired, including rules on permissible caseloads
per attorney. 85 The supreme court majority eschewed anythin so
absolute preferring instead a general call for legislative action. It
also refused to allow the state constitution's mandate for a
"uniform" system of indigent defense to be the ground of an
8
individual cause of action. T
On the other hand, the Peart majority was, in a way, too
radical. The only remedy it allowed was stopping prosecutions of
indigent defendants entirely, which meant much of the justice
system would grind to a halt. The dissent by Justice Dennis argued
for other remedies, like making systemic indigent defense
shortcomings a possible ground for vacating a conviction but
allowing the state to argue in opposition that the error was
harmless. 88 Since this approach would have allowed the criminal
justice process to go forward, it was better suited to actually being
used, as opposed to just threatened. By contrast, the Peart
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

621 So. 2d 780, 792-93 (La. 1993) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
Id.
See supranote 55 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 51-52 and accompanying text.
Peart,621 So. 2d at 795-96 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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majority's remedy required an indigent defense lawyer not only to
bring proceedings to a halt, but also to leave his client in limbo.
While proceedings were stopped, a defendant was effectively
barred from asserting his right to a speedy trial under Louisiana
law since the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a defendant to
assert he is ready for trial before enforcing that right. 89 The entire
point of a motion under Peart was to show the defendant is not
ready for trial because conditions in the indigent defense system
have left his lawyer unable to provide effective assistance. It is
therefore little wonder that Peart motions were relatively rare in
practice.
However, an unfulfilled threat that sparked legislative action
instead of judicial development was precisely what Peart was
designed to be, and the lower courts usually acted accordingly
when Peart was raised by litigants. Even as the indigent system
drifted back into crisis, courts frequently bent over backwards to
avoid actually using Peartto stop or overturn prosecutions, often
taking advantage of the ambiguities in the opinion's language to
argue that something like the Strickland showing of individualized
harm that changed the trial outcome was necessary. 90 There was
more evidence of an impact in the capital defense context,
particularly where the State v. Touchet companion case on funds
for expert testimony was also involved. 9' However, the wider
indigent defense system was generally unaltered by what had
seemed to be a revolutionary decision. The supreme court itself
was largely silent, perhaps waiting for a politically more opportune
moment to reenter the fray.
D. The Current Round of Reform: NationalAttention, a Renewed
Push by the LouisianaSupreme Court, andHurricaneKatrina
Given the disappointing results of the Peart-era changes,
Louisiana indigent defense seemed at a low point as the new
century began. Yet the seeds of a new round of reform were
already being planted. The foundation for the current Louisiana
reform effort was laid in part by the increased activities of national
advocacy groups since 2000 to spotlight inadequate indigent
defense across the entire country. In 2002, the American Bar
Association promulgated its Ten Principles of a Public Defense
89. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 701(D)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2009). See
also Kreamer, supranote 41, at 654.
90. See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 756 So. 2d 440, 443 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1999); State v. Hughes, 653 So. 2d 748, 751 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
91. See State v. Jeff, 761 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999).
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System setting out model standards for public defender
organization, training, caseloads, and performance. 92 These
became a widely cited guidepost for evaluating the health of
indigent defense systems. They also provided a map of what
reform should accomplish. At the same time, other national groups,
such as the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
(NLADA) and the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL), stepped up their work on this issue by
publishing studies of local systems in crisis and by offering
guidance for93 local reform campaigns in both the courts and state
legislatures.
Indigent defense groups in Louisiana began to consult formally
with representatives of these national organizations in 2002 and
2003. 94 These local groups then banded together and formed the
Louisiana Justice Coalition to work for an effective and sustainable
reform of indigent defense. 95 The backbone of the coalition was
the common participation of both the Louisiana Public Defenders
Association (LAPDA) and the Louisiana Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers (LACDL). This was crucial because friction
between the LACDL's centralization goal and the LAPDA's
attachment to local autonomy had almost crippled reform efforts
after Peart.96 Although these two groups formed the core of the
coalition, a number of other social reform groups were also
members including the Louisiana Interchurch Conference and the
Louisiana branch of the ACLU. 97
The coalition pursued a multi-part strategy for reform, drawing
on both successful efforts in other states and the lessons from past
failures in Louisiana. Efforts to address the ineffectiveness of the
1994 Peart-era reforms had typically floundered on the
aforementioned conflict between the LAPDA and LACDL, the
92. AM. BAR ASS'N,

TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY

SYSTEM (2002), http://www.abanet.org/ legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigent
defense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf [hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES].
93. See the activities described at NLADA: Defender Legal Services,
http://www.nlada.org/Defender (last visited Mar. 29, 2009) and National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), http://www.nacdl.org/
public.nsf/freeform/publicwelcome?opendocument (last visited Mar. 29, 2009),
respectively.
94. Email Interview with David Carroll, Director of Research &
Evaluations, Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n, in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct 15,
2007). See also David Carroll, Sounding Gideon's Trumpet, The Right to
Counsel Movement in Louisiana, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 139 (2008).
95. Boren Interview, supra note 26.
96. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
97. See La. Justice Coalition, Members and Partners, http://www.
lajusticecoalition.org/about/members (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
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suspicion of the Louisiana District Attorneys' Association, and
98
widespread indifference to indigent defense in the legislature.
The coalition therefore emphasized maintaining unity among the
reform groups and reaching out to consult with groups that had
historically been suspicious of reform, such as the district attorneys
and conservative Republicans in the legislature. 99 To combat
legislative indifference to the issue, the coalition began a campaign
of public education centered on the ABA's Ten Principles and the
concrete ways in which Louisiana failed to live up to them.' 00 An
important part of this effort was commissioning studies of indigent
defense across the State, in order 0to counter the idea that the crisis
was just a New Orleans problem.' '
Yet alongside these efforts at persuasion, the coalition also
pursued the possibility of direct action through the courts. In
cooperation with national organizations, local Louisiana groups
began to mount litigation efforts to revive Peart and have
dysfunctional Louisiana indigent defense systems declared
unconstitutional. 102 Suits were filed in different areas focusing on
unique problems with the current system. A suit in Shreveport
focused on the lack of independence local defense boards had from
the judiciary. 10 3 A sweeping class action suit filed in Calcasieu
parish attacked the lack
0 4 of dependable financing and the
overwhelming caseloads. 1

In late 2003, these efforts had early success in the form of
resolutions of the Louisiana Legislature recognizing the need for
reform and setting up a Louisiana Indigent Defense Task Force to
study proposals for change.' 0 5 In 2004, the studies of local indigent
defense systems began to be published. Especially comprehensive
was a report on the Avoyelles Parish system overseen by the
research arm of NLADA. r° 6 It found deep deficiencies in both

funding and organization that effectively denied indigent
defendants their constitutional rights. Studies of Calcasieu Parish,
Caddo Parish1 7New Orleans, and the Monroe area reached similar
conclusions.

6

98.
99.
100.
101.

Boren Interview, supra note 26.
Id.
Id.
Carroll Email Interview, supra note 94.

102.

SANCHEZ ET AL., supra note 43, at 19.

103. Id.

104. Id.
105. H.R. Res. 151, Reg. Sess. (La. 2003); S. Res. 112, Reg. Sess. (La. 2003).
106. PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 17.
107. NICHOLAS L. CHIARKIS, D. ALAN HENRY & RANDOLPH N. STONE, AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE IMMEDIATE AND LONGER TERM NEEDS OF THE NEW
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In addition, the litigation strategy began to bear fruit. Apart
from the broader class action case, another suit out of Calcasieu
Parish dealt with a specific emergency in which the indigent
defender office had no money to reimburse the expenses of
attorneys who had been judicially assigned to represent conflict of
interest defendants in several capital cases. In 2005, the Louisiana
Supreme Court handed down its State v. Citizen decision finding
this failure unconstitutional. 10 8 In doing so, it reaffirmed and
extended State v. Wigley, the companion case to Peart that had
held assigned counsel must be reimbursed for their reasonable
expenses.0 9 Citizen's extension of Wigley also explicitly
authorized courts faced with such a funding shortfall to apply the
Peart remedy of stopping a prosecution. 110 As in Peart,the court
coupled this threat with a direct call for legislative action on
indigent defense reform. 111
Other cases met with initial success in the lower courts. The
suit in Caddo Parish challenging excessive judicial influence over
local indigent defense systems fought off a standing challenge and
an exception of no cause of action to proceed to trial on the
merits. r2 The Calcasieu class action challenging the inadequate
funding structure also proceeded to trial, though not before being
transferred to East Baton Rouge Parish on the grounds that this
13
was the proper venue for a challenge to the entire state system.
In Rapides Parish, the local public defender office filed Peart
motions in several cases arguing that they were unable to provide
constitutionally adequate representation to the clients because of
inadequate funding.'l 4 The trial courts granted these motions and,

ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM

(2006);

MICHAEL

KURTH & DARYL

BURKEL, DEFENDING THE INDIGENT IN SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA (2004); STACY
MOAK & ROBERT S. NOAL, II, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NORTHEAST LOUISIANA: A
STUDY OF THE PUBLIC DEFENSE SYSTEMS OF THE THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, AND
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTS (2004), http://www.lajusticecoalition.org/docULAM
-Northeast-Louisiana-Study.pdf; BERNADETTE JONES PALOMBO & JEFFREY
SADOw, THE PROVISION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CADDO PARISH,

LOUISIANA (2004).
108. 898 So. 2d 325, 338 (La. 2005).
109. State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 429 (La. 1993).
110. Citizen, 898 So. 2d at 338-39.
111. Id. at337.
112. Walker v. State, 917 So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005), writ denied,
927 So. 2d 296 (La. 2006).
113. Anderson v. State, 916 So. 2d 431, 439 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2005), writ
denied, 929 So. 2d 1243 (La. 2006).
114. Boren Interview, supra note 26. See the Rapides Parish cases cited in
PUBLIC TO JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 3 n.9.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69

as a remedy, assigned outside counsel from the local bar." 5 This
set up future litigation on the issue of adequate reimbursement for
these attorneys in light of the Citizen holding.
Given all these developments, legislative action on indigent
defense might have seemed inevitable. However, significant
reform did not take place immediately. The Indigent Defense Task
Force, under the leadership of its chairman Senator Lydia Jackson,
decided in 2005 that the time was right only for a limited
legislative package of increasing the court fines paid into local
indigent defense funds and imposing more formal caseload
reporting requirements on local systems." 6 While some sort of
broader reform would likely have passed eventually, it almost
certainly would not have been so sweeping without a major
catalyzing event: Hurricane Katrina.
Hurricane Katrina energized the indigent defense reform
movement in two ways. First, it made the plight of indigent
defendants in Louisiana vastly more salient and concrete in public
awareness. The New Orleans public defender program essentially
collapsed in the wake of the storm. 117 Numerous indigent
defendants were evacuated to prisons across the state, out of reach
of any lawyer, or indeed of any basic knowledge of why they had
been held in the first place, leading to the phenomenon of
protracted
8 detention without charge known as "doing Katrina
time."'' 1
Katrina's other effect was less visible. It forced Louisiana's
various competing criminal justice interest groups to cooperate.
This first occurred in drafting legislation for emergency sessions of
of
court, which put in place procedures for the administration 119
criminal justice in the event of another mass disaster.
Representatives from Louisiana defense groups, the District
Attorneys association, the District Judges Association, various
local officials, and several academics formed an informal
deliberative body that crafted and then pushed for the passage of
the emergency court session legislation. Once created, this "big
tent" coalition could readily take on the problem of indigent
defense reform that Katrina had so starkly highlighted.'21
115. Boren Interview, supra note 26.
116. Id This proposal eventually became law, enacted as 2005 La. Acts No. 323.
117. See Brandon Garret & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The
Constitutionafter HurricaneKatrina,56 DuKE L.J. 127 (2006).
118. See Pamela R. Metzer, Doing Katrina Time, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1175 (2007).
119. Interview with Greg Riley, Counsel, La. House of Representatives,
Admin. of Justice Comm., in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 2, 2007).
120. Id.
121. Id.

2009]

COMMENTS

973

A drafting process for new indigent defense litigation began in
the spring of 2006, centered on the coordinating efforts of Greg
Riley, counsel to the House Committee on the Administration of
Criminal Justice. An email list of approximately thirty-five
participants was created, and the text of the proposed bill was sent
out and commented upon, a process that went through seventeen
drafts. 122 Finally in late 2006, consensus was reached on a bill
text. 12 In 2007, the bill was shepherded through the legislature by
House Criminal Justice chairman John Martiny largely without
alteration and without even much controversy, given the diverse
coalition that had been formed behind it. 124 In July of 2007, the bill
passed the House
25 with only one opposing vote and with only seven
in the Senate.'
III. THE NEW STATUTORY SCHEME FOR LOUISIANA INDIGENT
DEFENSE

The main features of the new indigent defense structure are the
product of the deliberations and compromises among the groups
that helped draft it before it was introduced in the legislature.
Where appropriate, I will take note of the influence of various
groups on specific provisions.
A. The New PublicDefender Boardand Its Powers
The statute transforms the LIDAB into the Louisiana Public
Defender Board. The old board's membership is transferred to the
new one, but much of its role will now be supervising an extensive
and statutorily mandated executive staff.' 26 The new framework
provides for a State Public Defender, meant to be the effective
CEO of the state indigent defense system. 127 Under the State
Public Defender are two deputy public defenders in charge of
training and juvenile defense, along with four officers with
responsibility over the budget, technology and management, trial
performance compliance, and juvenile defense compliance,
respectively.'2 8 The Louisiana statutory scheme is unusual both in
the number of positions that are statutorily mandated and in the
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. SANCHEZ ET AL., supra note 43, at 19-20.
125. G. Paul Marx, Act Takes La. Into 21st Century, THE ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge,
126.
127.
128.

La.), July 6, 2007, at B6.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:146(A) (2005 & Supp. 2009).
Seeid. § 15:152.
Id. § 15:150(A).
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detail with which their duties are delineated. 129 The specific
provision
for compliance officers is not merely unusual, but
130
unique.
Apart from selecting a staff, the board also has a statutory duty
to undertake a massive rulemaking task, promulgating state
standards for indigent defense in terms of workload limits, prompt
communication with clients, overall case performance, defender
qualifications, defender training, ethical obligations, and defender
compensation. 131 In addition, the board must set up procedures to
32
collect data, monitor performance, and sanction shortcomings.'
The workload rules are particularly important, given that they are
the clearest available metric for determining that a system does not
have the resources to meet its obligations. Since 1973, national
organizations like the ABA have used a rule advising that in any
given year no attorney should handle more than 150 felonies, 400
misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, or 25 appeals.1 33 Each of these
categorical limits stands for a year of full-time work by itself, 134 so
if a lawyer split his time half and half between felony and
misdemeanor work, the recommendation would be that he handle
75 felonies and 200 misdemeanors during the year. These limits
have been criticized as both arbitrarily chosen and far too rigid for
diverse criminal justice contexts across the country. 135 Of course,
even the advocacy groups present the limits as more of a rough
benchmark than a precise rule, and the old LIDAB, in crafting
what turned out to be its purely advisory standards, set caseload
limits as ranges: for example, a lawyer is supposed to handle a
maximum
of between 150 and 200 non-capital felony cases per
136
year.
The new statutory scheme requires the reconstituted state board
to go further and rethink the limits from the ground up, explicitly
adjusting them for different contexts. Section 15:148B(1)(a)
mandates the creation of "an empirically based case weighting
system that.., denotes the actual amount of attorney effort needed
129.
130.
131.

Carroll Email Interview, supra note 94.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 15:148.

132. Id.
133. See PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 33 n.108; TEN
PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, at 5 n.19.
134.

See PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 33 n. 108.

135. Telephone Interview with G. Pete Adams, Executive Director, La.
District Attorney's Ass'n, in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 9, 2007).
136. LA. PUB. DEFENDER BD., LOUISIANA STANDARDS ON INDIGENT
DEFENSE: CHAPTER 12: STANDARDS RELATING TO WORKLOAD FOR COUNSEL

PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES TO INDIGENTS (2006), http://www.lapdb.org/
Acrobat/o20files/Chapter/o20 12.PDF [hereinafter PERFORMANCE STANDARDS].
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to bring a specific case to an appropriate disposition." In crafting
this case weighting system, the board is enjoined to consider "the
variation . . . in rural, urban and suburban jurisdictions;"
differences across districts in prosecutorial, judicial, and
sentencing practices, differences in trial rates, the "extent and
quality of supervision" for public defenders, the relative
availability of support staff like investigators, and specific client
characteristics that can require more work on an particular case,
such as a mental health handicap. This mandate is a clear advance
over flat rules unadjusted for context, but it also requires an
exceptionally complex rulemaking process. Even measuring some
of the statutory factors will be difficult, let alone determining a
specific weight for them. 137 To take one at random, how will
"judicial processing practice" be determined for a particular
district? Reformulating the caseload limits is a worthwhile
enterprise, but it promises to strain the board's own workload
capacity, even apart from the numerous other rulemaking tasks the
legislature has required.
Forming performance standards for other aspects of indigent
defense will not be as complicated. Indeed, these rules would be
already partially complete if the board was allowed to enforce
regulations previously promulgated by the LIDAB. These include
an elaborate set of performance standards based on those adopted
in Georgia, setting forth the duties a defender should fulfill at each
stage of the case. 38 These rules were passed in accordance with
the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act, so there is no doubt
about their validity on that front. Nevertheless, the board is
required to reenact the regulations in every area, even though the
statute goes on to re uire that the new standards be "based" upon
the preexisting rules. 39 Perhaps since the board now has power to
force compliance with its rules, the legislature believed that a fresh
rulemaking process was necessary, given that otherwise interested
parties may not have paid attention to the earlier creation of what
were mere unenforced guidelines.
137. For a discussion of the issues involved in case weighting and caseload
measures for indigent defenders generally, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE (2001),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/185632.pdf.
138.

See generally LA. PUB. DEFENDER BD., LOUISIANA STANDARDS ON

INDIGENT DEFENSE

(2006), http://www.lapdb.org/standards.htm. For the Georgia

standards, see GA. PUB.

DEFENDER STANDARDS COUNCIL, STATE OF GEORGIA
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN
INDIGENT CRIMINAL CASES (2004), http://www.gpdsc.com/cpdsystem-standards-

main.htm.
139. LA. REv.

STAT. ANN.

§ 15:148(B)(1)(f) (2005 & Supp. 2009).
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Besides its power to create binding standards for the local
districts, the board also has a significant degree of direct
management power over them. The old foundation of local control,
the district indigent defense boards, is abolished by the new
statutory scheme. This step was a key demand of groups insisting
on effective central authority, such as the LACDL. The local
boards were seen as fatally compromising the independence of
indigent defense since they were appointed by local judges and
perceived as being improperly influenced by them. 4 0 They were
also often found to be dysfunctional in practice, abdicating their
management responsibilities to the local chief defenders and in
some cases failing to meet or keep records for long stretches of
time.14 1 The new state board now absorbs much of their formal
management authority. Thus, in those judicial districts currently
without a chief public defender, the board has authority to either
hire a public defender or assign a public defender to it from
another contiguous district. 142 For all existing districts, the board
has the power, after a hearing and in accordance with applicable
statutory standards, to change the mode of delivery or terminate
the current local defender. 143It is also given the authority to review
and approve the annual budget from each district.144
B. The Survival of Local Autonomy
So far this seems an unambiguous centralizing reform.
However, advocates of decentralization, such as the LAPDA, also
made an impact on the bill. The local funding system based on
local fines, a target of so much criticism over the years, is
retained. 145 The funds raised in each locality remain in each
district's indigent fund, despite suggestions that it would be more
equitable for local fees to be paid into a common statewide account
and then distributed to each district according to need. Thus, state
146
funding remains a supplement to the local fine money.
Furthermore, despite the extensive powers the board is given over
them, the local defenders are not consolidated into a statewide
organization. They are not state employees; even without the local
140. Boren Interview, supra note 26.
141. Id.
142. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:161(I) (Supp. 2009).
143. Id. §§ 15:165, 170.
144. Id. § 15:155.
145. Id. § 15:168.
146. However, after the recent funding increases the level of state spending is
now close to that derived from local fines. See infra notes 177-178 and
accompanying text.
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47
boards they still constitute a sort of local political subdivision.
The legislature reinforced this conclusion in 2008 by passing an
amendment explicitly declaring that employees of an indigent
defense district are local, not state, employees.' 4 8 In addition, the
statutory scheme admonishes the board to respect local diversity in
indigent defense, sets up a presumption that a preexisting local
method of delivery is adequate until shown otherwise, and holds
that local chief defenders employed by January 2007
149 shall continue
in office with undiminished salaries and benefits.
Even where new powers have been clearly granted to the state
board, they are often hedged with procedures that preserve local
influence. The mechanism for hiring a new district chief defender
is an apt example. For a new district defender to be hired, a
selection committee is appointed comprised of three attorneys
domiciled in the district, one appointed by the local chief district
judge, one by the Louisiana Bar Association, and one by the state
public defender 150 This committee submits a list of three names to
the state board, which then chooses one to be the new district
defender.151 The separation of the hiring process into a nomination
stage weighted towards local influence and an appointment stage
controlled by the state board represents a hard fought compromise
between the LACDL, who wanted hiring to be a purely state
52
power, and the LAPDA, who wanted it to remain entirely local.'
Another indication of the conflict between consolidation and
localism is the extraordinarily complicated use of the "region"
device in the statute. Following recent reforms in Georgia and
Montana, an early draft of the bill foresaw the consolidation of the
153
forty-one local indigent defense districts into eleven regions.
The regional offices would have directly managed the operations
in each district, reporting directly to the state board. 154 They would
also have consolidated several human resources functions for
greater efficiency, as well as providing regional services in
specialized areas like appellate work or capital defense. However,

147. Marx Telephone Interview, supra note 57.
148. 2008 La. Acts. No. 2 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15:147(E) (2005 & Supp. 2009)).
149. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:142(B)(3), (F), 161(H), 165(C) (Supp.
2009).
150. Id. § 15:162.
151.

Id.

152. Riley Interview, supra note 119.
153. Id.
154.

Id.
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the LAPDA objected to this as stripping too much power from the
local level. 155 As a result, the statute uses "region" in three ways.
First, the statute still gives the state board power to create up to
eleven "service regions," but the decision to create them and the
exact number created is left discretionary, so long as no one district
has more than 500,000 inhabitants. 156 Each service region would
be headed by a regional director chosen by a regional selection
committee composed of three representatives from each judicial
district in the region. 157 For each district, one representative each
would be appointed by the local bar association, the local chief
district judge, and the state board. 158 As with the district selection
committees, three nominees would be submitted to59the state board,
from which it would choose the regional director.'
Even if they are established, the managerial power of the
service region office over the districts is unclear. They would
coexist with the chief defenders for each local system. The
regional director and local defenders are each given a list of
powers, but the local defender's list is longer and more explicit.
The regional directors are allowed to build their own staffs and
provide regional services, 6presumably in areas like appellate
practice or capital defense.' 6 The directors are also given general
authority to "supervise" indigent defense services within each
district that forms a part of their regions, as well as specific
authority to oversee the local chief defenders' decisions on
complying with state standards and making contracts for services
in the district.' 6' They also have power to change the method of
delivery in a district after a 62
consultation process with the local
defenders and the state board.
The local chief defenders are, by contrast, given authority to
"manage and supervise" services in their districts. 163 Alongside the
contracting and compliance responsibilities that the regional
directors would supervise, local defenders are given specific power
to hire and fire district personnel, with no mention of regional
oversight. 164 On budgetary affairs, the statutory scheme is
ambiguous. On the one hand, regional offices are given
155. Id.
156. LA. REV. STATANN. § 15:159.
157. Id. § 15:160(D).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 15:160(F)-(H).
160. Id. § 15:160(B).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. § 15:161(E).
164. Id.
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supervisory power over "budgetary" matters. 16 5 On the other, the
district chief defenders are enjoined to deal directly with the state
budget officer in formulating their annual
66 spending proposals, with
no mention of a regional intermediary.1
That these apparent limits on the regional director's authority
are real is confirmed by the second sense in which "region" is
used. Section 15:163 authorizes the state board to "regionalize"
indigent defense services in a district under one of three
circumstances: sustained failure of the local district to comply with
state standards, a request by the district public defender himself for
regionalization, or a natural disaster that prevents the local office
from functioning. This step can only take place after a public
hearing. Once regionalized, a local district will be run from a
regional office, assuming one has been established. The regional
director will be "manager and supervisor" of the district, as
opposed to the limited supervisory power he has over a nonregionalized system. 167 The chief defender of a regionalized
district becomes an "employee of the region," as compared to his
previous quasi-independent status. Logically, this gives the
168
regional director all the former power of the local defender.
Thus, only after an additional "regionalization" process allowed
only under limited circumstances would a service region in
Louisiana have the same power it automatically has in state
systems like Georgia or Montana.
To complicate matters further, "region" is used in another
sense besides "service region" and "regionalization." The statutory
scheme allows for an entirely separate third entity called "regional
defense service centers."' 69 This device is actually a holdover from
pre-2007 Louisiana indigent defense law. With approval of the
state board, local districts can agree among themselves to create a
regional service center to pool resources for certain specialized
uses like apellate work, capital defense, or certain administrative
However, these service centers are forbidden by
functions.
statute from taking on functions beyond what the component
districts originally assigned to them.171 Thus, despite the
nomenclature, a regional service center apparently could not serve
as the office of a service region, and therefore also could not be
used to "regionalize" a local district.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.§
Id.§
Id. §
Id.
Id. §
Id.
Id. §

15:159(C).
15:161(E)(2).
15:163(A).
15:164.
15:164(F).
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The fractured use of "region" in the statute is one of the
clearest monuments to the resilience of local autonomy in the
midst of a centralizing reform. Whereas others states have used
regions as the building blocks for unambiguous advances in state
power, their future use is far more uncertain in Louisiana. Only
"regionalization" would bring the independent power of local chief
defenders fully under control. Moreover, the use of "regional
service centers" offers a way for local districts to get some of the
benefits of service regions, like help in capital defense cases,
without the loss of any authority at all.
C. Other Features of the New Structure
The new statutory scheme explicitly and at length denies that it
is creating any new private statutory right of action for indigent
defendants to demand improved representation. 172 This was
included at the express insistence of the Louisiana District
Attorneys' Association, which was concerned that the creation of
new standards by the board would lead to new challenges by
defendants to their convictions in areas where the standards had
not previously been met. 173 Though that certainly does not prevent
the Louisiana Supreme Court from interpreting the state
constitution as providing an expanded private right of action, the
statutory scheme at least seems to foresee enforcement of
improved standards as exclusively a matter for the board itself.
Finally, the new system is notable for the long deadline the
legislature has allowed for it to become fully operational: August
15, 2011, over four years after the reform's enactment.1 74 By this,
the legislature seemed to recognize what a large regulatory and
organizational task it had given to the new board.
IV. OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEALING WITH THEM

A. FutureFundingShortfalls and the PossibleJudicialResponse
Clearly the most significant obstacle to the new system's
success is uncertain funding in the future. The fact that the local
systems are still partially reliant on local court fines means the
legislature may be tempted in the future to return to an era of flat
or declining state funding, using the excuse that the local systems
172. Id. § 15:173.
173. Adams Telephone Interview, supra note 135.
174. 2007 La. Acts No. 307.
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can survive on their own funds. The experience of other states
shows again and again that no amount of structural reform can
make up for funding shortfalls. Even though a single state defender
organization may be preferred on the grounds of unity and equity,
such systems have repeatedly fallen into crisis where state funding
has declined. 175 Funding is also the easiest method of assuring state
control. Rather than having to order and directly coerce local
systems to comply, ample funding allows a state board to let local
systems become dependent on state funds and then use the
possibility of withdrawal76 to ensure compliance with far fewer
enforcement headaches. 1
It may be that funding does not become a problem. The
legislature this time may keep its commitment to adequately fund
indigent defense and provide healthy increases as time passes. The
last few years have seen a remarkable growth in state spending on
indigent defense. State funding was doubled in 2006 to $20
million 17 and given another substantial increase in 2007 to $28.6
million. 78 However, the experience of both Louisiana and any
number of other states shows that funding usually dries up, and it
can do so quite quickly. Indigent defense is rarely going to be a
popular election year spending item in any state. 179
Even when a political coalition for greater support has been
formed, it is highly vulnerable to changes in the political and legal
environment. Thus, while the state of Georgia increased aid to
indigent defense with bipartisan backing in 2003, the state system
was thrown into crisis in 2007 by the large financial strains of a
single case, the defense of Brian Nichols against capital murder
charges stemming from a highly publicized courthouse shooting
that killed a judge and several employees.' 80 The legislature
refused to make up the shortfall turning against the Georgia board
175. Consider Missouri, which has a model statewide form of defender
organization, but which has funding that gives it among the lowest per capita
rates of spending in the nation. Douglas Copeland, Missouri's Public Defender
Program, 62 J. Mo. B. (Jan.-Feb. 2006), available at http://www.mobar.org/
c5a77d59-7f2c-4634-bada-93ac6962678c.aspx.
176. PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 24.
177.

LA. OFFICE OF PLANNING & BUDGET, LOUISIANA STATE BUDGET,

FISCAL YEAR 2006-2007 2R (2006).
178. LA. OFFICE OF PLANNING & BUDGET, LOUISIANA STATE BUDGET PART
1, FISCAL YEAR 2007-2008 2gg (2007). The 2008-2009 budget saw a relatively
modest increase to approximately $29.5 million. LA. OFFICE OF PLANNING &
BUDGET, LOUISIANA STATE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2008-2009 58 (2008).
179. Riley Interview, supra note 119.
180. Shaila Dewan & Brenda Goodman, Capital Cases Stall as Costs Grow
Daunting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/us/
04penalty.html?pagewanted= 1&r= 1.
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on the basis of what was -perceived as overly lavish spending on a
clearly guilty defendant."' In protest, the chief of the state capital
defense section resigned. 182 The board was forced to make severe
cutbacks83 in other areas, putting recent improvements under
threat.'
Given that funding shortfalls are likely to reoccur, what
recourse would the Louisiana reform community have in dealing
with them? One option is a revival of the litigation campaigns to
secure better support. If so, the Louisiana Supreme Court would
once again have to consider the best method of moving the
political branches. Of course, the question of funding rarely comes
to a court directly in an indigent defense case. Rather, the funding
issue arises because of the presence of its symptoms: unsustainably
heavy caseloads for public defenders, little or no resources for
expert witnesses or investigators, and inadequately compensated
attorneys. Litigation seizes on these conditions as a way to force
improved funding.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's approach so far in Peart and
Citizen has been to recognize such systemic deficiencies without
providing clear standards for what would count as a
constitutionally adequate system of indigent defense. Instead, the
legislature has been encouraged to craft its own solutions, while
the court threatens to authorize the halt of prosecutions in the
absence of improved support.' 84 As discussed, the combination of
vague principles with a fairly drastic remedy has meant public
defenders have been wary of bringing such challenges and lower
courts have sometimes been reluctant to grant those that have been
brought.' 8 5 This meant the Peartruling was rarely enforced before
the flurry of litigation preceding the new reform, litigation that
benefited immensely from the expertise, resources, and
independence of the national and state organizations involved. The
average public defender confronting systemic
deficiencies will not
186
have anything like the same advantages.
Are there alternative paths the court could take that could make
its interventions in this area more easily enforced and effective?
Courts in other states have tried a variety of other approaches. In
State v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court actually mandated the
181. Patrik Jonsson, On Trial in Atlanta: Cost of Justice, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MoNrrOR, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1029/p02s01-usju.
html?page=l.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
186. Boren Interview, supra note 26.
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adoption of specific service standards congruent with
contemporary ABA guidelines on indigent defense. 7 Under this
approach, private litigants would be able to make a prima facie
showing of inadequate assistance of counsel if, for example,
caseloads rise above a certain level. This would provide a clear
guide for what has been an unexceptionally indeterminate area of
the law.
The court could also vary its stance of the proper remedy for
systemic problems in indigent defense. One way would be to
mandate certain financial remedies. In State v. Lynch, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court directly required the state to raise
attorney compensation across the state to a certain level. 188 An
alternative remedy strategy would be to take the route urged by
Justice Dennis' dissent in Peart.This would attempt to make the
Peartand Citizen remedy more effective by, paradoxically, making
it less drastic. Rather than stopping prosecutions altogether, a
finding of inadequate representation produced by systemic
deficiencies would shift the burden to the prosecution to show that
these deficiencies were harmless error that did not affect the
outcome. 189 It would be harder to sustain convictions under this
approach, but the criminal justice system would not grind to a halt.
Yet debate about alternative paths the court could pursue
obscures the reality that litigation driven reform has been fragile
virtually everywhere, regardless of how the judicial decisions
mandating change have been written. In Arizona, State v. Smith
resulted in the end of a low bid system for county indigent defense
that ratcheted down funding to crisis levels. But funding and
workload problems were still pervasive a few years after State1 v.
90
Smith despite its specific mandate of national service standards.
Recently, some counties in the state have been thrown into crisis
by the strain of rising numbers of capital cases. 191 In Oklahoma,
State v. Lynch sparked increased state financing and the adoption
of a statewide system run by a central board. 92 However, in recent
years funding cuts have devastated this office.' 93 In short, different
187. 681 P.2d 1374, 1381-82 (Ariz. 1984).
188. 796P.2d 1150, 1161 (Okla. 1990).
189. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
190. Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address
UnderfundedIndigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1741 (2005).
191. Jahna Berry, Ending Jam of Capital Cases to Cost "Millions", THE
ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoenix, Ariz.), Mar. 8, 2007, http://www.nlada.org/DMS/
Documents/1173372091.75/0308deathpenalty0308.html.
192. Effectively Ineffective, supranote 190, at 1739.
193. OKLA. INDIGENT DEF. Sys., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2006),
("While
http://www.ok.gov/OIDS/documents/2006%2OAnnual%20Report.pdf
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judicial approaches have not spared numerous other jurisdictions
the same experience Louisiana had after Peart: an initial burst of
reform triggered by a court decision, followed by stagnation,
reversals, and a return to inadequate funding and crisis.
Some scholars believe that the somewhat disappointing results
of the litigation campaigns so far only show that no state court has
been sufficiently bold. The adoption of new techniques, like
appointing a special master to oversee a ruling's implementation
over the long term, would allow courts to force improved support
even in an adverse political environment. 194 The perceived success
of several federal district courts in improving prison conditions is
pointed to as a model. 195 However, these more intrusive steps
would all have the effect of making the judiciary the direct
manager of indigent defense agencies for indefinite periods of
time. There is every reason to believe this will rarely if ever be
acceptable to the courts.
Aside from the natural reluctance of courts to undertake
complicated administrative functions, perhaps surmountable by
itself, having the judiciary running a protracted reorganization of
one side of the adversarial criminal justice process would raise
questions about the courts' impartiality that would be at best
uncomfortable and at worst politically explosive. Even if a court
involved itself so deeply, the central question of funding would
still remain out of its direct control. It could attempt to order
certain levels of spending, but its recourse in the event of
noncompliance would only be some version of halting
prosecutions or reversing convictions leaving it in precisely the
same place as the Louisiana Supreme Court after Peart.
The best conclusion to draw from this is that what really
matters is the stability and strength of the political coalition
backing indigent defense reform, as opposed to the doctrinal stance
of the court decisions mandating it. Judicial victories are valuable
insofar as they help gather political and administrative support for
change, but they have only limited effect on their own. Indeed,
some of the more successful litigation campaigns for indigent
196
defense have stopped short of a final decision on the merits.
the reduction-in-force hindered the agency's ability to effectively represent its
clients, the lack of adequate funding left it with no viable alternatives.").
194. Effectively Ineffective, supra note 190, at 1750.
195. See generally Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do
To Improve the Delivery of CriminalDefense Services, 63 U. Prr. L. REV. 293
(2002).
196. In Connecticut, a lawsuit filed by the ACLU triggered negotiations with

legislative and executive leaders, resulting in a 1999 settlement that has so far
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The genius of the reform effort that produced the new
Louisiana system was that it proceeded on multiple tracks.
Alongside the litigation strategy, there was constant work to
educate the public at large and to persuade interested organizations
that they each had a stake in the reform. Sustaining adequate
funding will depend on sustaining the broad coalition that
produced the new system. Nothing could be more detrimental to
success than for any part of the reform community to believe they
can achieve their goals outside the political process through
judicial fiat. Rather, interested groups must maintain both their
engagement on the issue and a united front. The Louisiana State
Bar Association's sustained involvement with the issue is
particularly important since it offers a neutral, profession-wide
ground of support for reform, independent of any particular
political fracture. The ongoing involvement of the LAPDA and
LACDL defense organizations is not in question, but what is
crucial is that they maintain their newfound unity and not return to
the infighting that crippled earlier reform efforts.
That is not to say that litigation has no place at all in future
efforts to ensure adequate funding and support. Clearly, both the
Citizen decision and the court cases still ongoing at the time the
legislature acted had a substantial impact. Advocates of reform
were able to argue that the legislature had to act quickly before the
courts imposed their own solution.' 97 But this only emphasizes that
judicial action will be most effective where such threats do not
have to be followed through upon. In this respect, to the extent that
the form of decisions matter at all, the path chosen by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Peart and Citizen seems as good or
better than any of the proposed alternatives. The threat of stopping
prosecutions was severe enough to focus attention, and the refusal
to impose specific guidelines meant the political process was not
prevented from making its own innovations or pushed into active
resistance by a solution it could not accept.
Indeed, after a

provided sustained increased support for the state public defender system.
CONN. Div. OF PUB. DEFENDER SERVS., THIRTY YEARS IN REVIEw (2005),
http://www.ocpd.state.ct.us/Content/30years.htm. The ACLU launched similar
litigation in Montana, only to withdraw it in 2005 after the legislature passed a
reform establishing a new state system. See the ACLU efforts discussed at Am.
Civil Liberties Union: Criminal Justice: Right to Counsel, http://www.aclu.org/
crimjustice/indigent/index.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
197. Riley Interview, supra note 119.
198. If the court, for example, had imposed specific caseload limits, the
legislature might have been deterred from mandating that the new state board
come up with a new, more context driven set of limits.
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careful review of the alternatives, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court recently took the same approach of holding that
prosecutions could be quashed, while at the same time refusing to
order a specific solution in reaction to a pay crisis for assigned
counsel.'" The main limitation of this stance is that for it to be
most effective, courts must exercise a delicate prudential judgment
on the question of when to act.
B. BuildingInstitutionalCapacity and ExercisingAuthority over
the Local Districts
Besides maintaining funding and political support, reform
advocates will also have to pay close attention to the practical
implementation of the new system. Indeed, the two broad issues
are closely intertwined. Just as adequate state funding is crucial for
the board's ability to push through reform in the local systems, the
effective establishment and operation of the system is essential for
reinforcing political support and the willingness to fund the
system. A system that is laggard, inefficient, or conflict ridden in
its administration will quickly lose legislative backing.
In this respect, there are two main dangers. First, the scale of
the new board's workload in hiring and rulemaking, along with the
extensive public hearing requirements in the bill, threaten to cause
long delays in its effective operation. Second, the ambiguities in
the statute on the borderline between local and state authority
threaten to spark conflict as the new board tries to produce change.
In each of these areas, relatively small changes in the
underlying statutory scheme could alleviate some of the problems.
The new law mandates a long list of offices with fairly specific
duties. It would be more convenient to give additional flexibility to
the board on whom it must hire for what tasks. The law could
specify required functions without making each and every one a
required position. On rulemaking, the new board should be
allowed whenever possible to simply enforce the rules crafted by
the old LIDAB, rather than having to reenact through the same
Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking process that it
has already gone through once.
In terms of local authority, one clear ambiguity is the power of
supervision a service region office has over a local district that has
not been regionalized. The statute gives overlapping and vaguely
detailed lists of duties to each, particularly on budget issues. Some
clarification of the statutory language could prevent protracted
199. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass.
2004).
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disputes when and if regional offices are established. Also, the
power of the board to terminate a local defender after a hearing is
largely limited by the statute to instances of "willful" failure or
refusal to conform to various standards. 20 0 The "willful" language,
if read literally, would prevent dismissals even in the case of
severe incompetence so long as some good faith effort to comply is
shown. This has the potential to hinder the board's ability to
improve services in severely underperforming local systems. The
standard could be amended to clearly provide for incompetencebased terminations without giving the board the unbounded firing
power the local defenders fear.
V. CONCLUSION

The new public defender system is a substantial achievement
after such a long and tortured record of failed reforms in Louisiana
indigent defense. It offers the first real hope in decades that
indigent criminal defendants will receive effective representation.
However, that same troubled history should prevent us from being
complacent about the new system's prospects. Ongoing political
mobilization of support and concentrated work on the details of
implementation are both essential to any lasting success.
RichardDrew*

200. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:170 (Supp. 2009). By contrast, protected civil
service employees can be terminated for "cause," defined as any "conduct which
impairs the efficient or orderly operation of the public service." LA. Civ. SERV.
RuLES 12.2(b), 1.5.2.01 (2008).
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